论文标题
SOK：对微体系优化的攻击的根本原因和防御策略的分析
SoK: Analysis of Root Causes and Defense Strategies for Attacks on Microarchitectural Optimizations
论文作者
论文摘要
预计微体系式优化将在确保未来技术节点的性能可伸缩性方面发挥关键作用。但是，最近的攻击表明，可以利用假定安全的微体系式优化。此外，新的攻击以快速的速度表面限制了现有防御范围。这些事态发展促使需要审查微型结构优化，重点是安全，了解攻击格局和潜在的防御策略。 我们分析了针对各种微体系式优化的基于计时的侧向通道攻击。我们提供了一个框架，用于分析非传播和瞬态攻击，这突出了相似之处。我们通过系统分析确定了基于计时的侧通道攻击的四个根本原因：确定性，共享，访问违规和信息流。我们的关键见解是，在任何攻击步骤中，都可以通过攻击并消除任何被剥削的根本原因来利用根本原因（或全部）根本原因，足以提供保护。利用我们的框架，我们将现有防御系统系统化，并表明它们在不同的攻击步骤中针对这些根本原因。
Microarchitectural optimizations are expected to play a crucial role in ensuring performance scalability in future technology nodes. However, recent attacks have demonstrated that microarchitectural optimizations, which were assumed to be secure, can be exploited. Moreover, new attacks surface at a rapid pace limiting the scope of existing defenses. These developments prompt the need to review microarchitectural optimizations with an emphasis on security, understand the attack landscape and the potential defense strategies. We analyze timing-based side-channel attacks targeting a diverse set of microarchitectural optimizations. We provide a framework for analysing non-transient and transient attacks, which highlights the similarities. We identify the four root causes of timing-based side-channel attacks: determinism, sharing, access violation and information flow, through our systematic analysis. Our key insight is that a subset (or all) of the root causes are exploited by attacks and eliminating any of the exploited root causes, in any attack step, is enough to provide protection. Leveraging our framework, we systematize existing defenses and show that they target these root causes in the different attack steps.
