论文标题
弹性多构系统的两人游戏不完整的游戏
Two-Player Incomplete Games of Resilient Multiagent Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
在面对干扰攻击时，在共识方案下，代理在共识方案下的多动力系统动态的演变进行了讨论，其中集中政党能够影响代理的控制信号。在本文中，我们专注于多种系统的游戏理论方法，在该方法中，玩家对对手的力量有不完整的信息。我们考虑使用同时和顺序的玩家动作重复游戏，玩家随着时间的推移彼此之间的信念。根据贝叶斯nash平衡和完美的贝叶斯平衡对代理商共识的最佳策略的影响。结果表明，尽管有足够的资源可以这样做，但具有不完整知识的攻击者可能无法阻止共识。
Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a game-theoretical approach of multiagent systems where the players have incomplete information on their opponents' strength. We consider repeated games with both simultaneous and sequential player actions where players update their beliefs of each other over time. The effect of the players' optimal strategies according to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium on agents' consensus is examined. It is shown that an attacker with incomplete knowledge may fail to prevent consensus despite having sufficient resources to do so.
