论文标题
教育政策中的地方政治控制：英格兰地方教育当局根据英格兰的权力改革的证据
Local political control in educational policy: Evidence from decentralized teacher pay reform under England's local education authorities
论文作者
论文摘要
2012年，学校教师的评论机构中止了中央指导，并允许学校酌情决定在英格兰的教师薪水。同时，地方教育当局（LEAS）向Lea-Controllollroll Controlloll的学校提供了非遗产教师的薪酬建议。这项研究研究了LEAS的政党控制如何确定他们有关是否采用灵活的绩效薪酬或继续基于资历的薪酬的指导。回归不连续设计用于解决政治控制和教育政策制定的内生性。我们发现，略有保守的控制的租赁更倾向于推荐面向市场的灵活薪酬结构。结果对替代规格仍然很强。这项研究表明，英格兰地方教育政策制定中的政治至关重要，这对未来的政策具有广泛的影响。
In 2012, the School Teachers' Review Body discontinued central guidance and allowed school discretion in determining teachers' pay in England. Meanwhile, local education authorities (LEAs) offer non-statutory teacher pay recommendations to LEA-controlled schools. This study examines how LEAs' political party control determines their guidance regarding whether to adopt flexible performance pay or continue seniority-based pay. A regression discontinuity design is used to address the endogeneity of political control and educational policy-making. We find that marginally Conservative-controlled LEAs are more inclined to recommend market-oriented flexible pay structures. The results remain robust to alternative specifications. This study reveals that politics matter in England's local educational policy-making, which has broad implications for future policy.
