论文标题
通过消费学习：使用内源性信息提供的最佳定价
Learning by Consuming: Optimal Pricing with Endogenous Information Provision
论文作者
论文摘要
当买方的价值因逐费定而内源性发展时，我们研究了收入最大化的机制。卖方出售一个可分裂的商品的单位，而买家则依靠他的私人估值来选择他的第一阶段消费水平。消费更多会导致更精确的估值估算，然后买家决定了第二阶段的消费水平。最佳是尝试合同的菜单，包括第一阶段的价格量化对和剩余数量的第二阶段每单位价格。在均衡中，较高的第一阶段估值买家为更高的第一阶段消费付费更多，并且每单位价格较低。从方法上讲，我们处理的困难是由于单跨条件失败，分配中的单调性以及信封条件不足以激励兼容性。我们的结果有助于了解有关依次消费的合同；例如，租赁某些课程的商品和试用会议合同。
We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer's value evolves endogenously because of learning-by-consuming. A seller sells one unit of a divisible good, while the buyer relies on his private, rough valuation to choose his first-stage consumption level. Consuming more leads to a more precise valuation estimate, after which the buyer determines the second-stage consumption level. The optimum is a menu of try-and-decide contracts, consisting of a first-stage price-quantity pair and a second-stage per-unit price for the remaining quantity. In equilibrium, a higher first-stage valuation buyer pays more for higher first-stage consumption and enjoys a lower second-stage per-unit price. Methodologically, we deal with the difficulty that due to the failure of single-crossing condition, monotonicity in allocation plus the envelope condition is insufficient for incentive compatibility. Our results help to understand contracts about sequential consumption with the learning feature; e.g., leasing contracts for experience goods and trial sessions for certain courses.
