论文标题
XDRI攻击 - 和 - 如何增强住宅路由器的弹性
XDRI Attacks - and - How to Enhance Resilience of Residential Routers
论文作者
论文摘要
我们探索住宅路由器的安全性，并找到一系列关键漏洞。我们的评估表明，36个受欢迎的路由器中有10个容易通过误解特殊字符注射假记录。我们还发现，在36个路由器中，有15个可以规避旨在防止缓存中毒攻击的机制。在我们通过广告网络的互联网范围内的研究中，我们确定了Web客户端使用的976个住宅路由器，其中95％以上被发现容易受到我们的攻击。总体而言，脆弱的路由器很普遍，并分布在177个国家和4830个网络之间。了解导致漏洞的核心因素，我们对路由器进行黑色和白色盒子分析。我们发现，许多问题可能归因于关于协议行为和互联网的错误假设，误解了标准建议，错误和简化的DNS软件实现。我们提供建议减轻攻击的建议。我们还设置了一个工具，使每个人都能通过https://xdi-attack.net/评估路由器的安全性。
We explore the security of residential routers and find a range of critical vulnerabilities. Our evaluations show that 10 out of 36 popular routers are vulnerable to injections of fake records via misinterpretation of special characters. We also find that in 15 of the 36 routers the mechanisms, that are meant to prevent cache poisoning attacks, can be circumvented. In our Internet-wide study with an advertisement network, we identified and analyzed 976 residential routers used by web clients, out of which more than 95% were found vulnerable to our attacks. Overall, vulnerable routers are prevalent and are distributed among 177 countries and 4830 networks. To understand the core factors causing the vulnerabilities we perform black- and white-box analyses of the routers. We find that many problems can be attributed to incorrect assumptions on the protocols' behaviour and the Internet, misunderstanding of the standard recommendations, bugs, and simplified DNS software implementations. We provide recommendations to mitigate our attacks. We also set up a tool to enable everyone to evaluate the security of their routers at https://xdi-attack.net/.
