论文标题
在瑞士市场中选择道德危害的强制性健康保险：瑞士家居小组数据的经验证据
Selection on moral hazard in the Swiss market for mandatory health insurance: Empirical evidence from Swiss Household Panel data
论文作者
论文摘要
关于道德危害的选择代表了根据利用率的异质性“斜率”选择特定的健康保险范围的趋势。我使用来自瑞士家用面板的数据和公开可用的监管数据来探索瑞士托管竞争系统中斜率选择的程度。我使用ROY型模型来估算（日志）医生访问对最低和最高免赔额水平的反应，从而通过局部仪器变量确定边缘治疗效果。高道德危害类型中对高覆盖计划的反应（即可扣除水平最低的计划）比平均水平高25-35％。
Selection on moral hazard represents the tendency to select a specific health insurance coverage depending on the heterogeneity in utilisation ''slopes''. I use data from the Swiss Household Panel and from publicly available regulatory data to explore the extent of selection on slopes in the Swiss managed competition system. I estimate responses in terms of (log) doctor visits to lowest and highest deductible levels using Roy-type models, identifying marginal treatment effects with local instrumental variables. The response to high coverage plans (i.e. plans with the lowest deductible level) among high moral hazard types is 25-35 percent higher than average.
