论文标题
提供放缓的信息以改善自私的路由
Providing slowdown information to improve selfish routing
论文作者
论文摘要
社会科学的最新研究已经确定了情况，即提供给消费者的信息的方式很小，可以对行为产生巨大的影响。这已在公共卫生和保健领域的流行媒体中促进，但其在其他领域的应用并未得到广泛研究。本文提出了一个简单的模型，该模型表达了向通勤者提供有关运输网络各种道路的总流量“减速”的精心策划信息的效果。向通勤者提供信息的许多工作专门针对旅行时间信息。但是，本文中的模型允许系统规划师也提供减速信息。也就是说，通勤者还被告知，与其未经食的状态相比，每条路线的速度较慢。我们表明，与仅给出有关旅行时间的信息相比，提供此其他信息可以提高平衡路由效率，但是这些拥塞的改善并不普遍。也就是说，存在任何放缓信息的提供的运输网络都会损害平衡拥塞。此外，本文阐明了通勤速度敏感性的影响与对拥堵游戏中边际成本定价和利他主义的研究之间的巨大联系。
Recent research in the social sciences has identified situations in which small changes in the way that information is provided to consumers can have large aggregate effects on behavior. This has been promoted in popular media in areas of public health and wellness, but its application to other areas has not been broadly studied. This paper presents a simple model which expresses the effect of providing commuters with carefully-curated information regarding aggregate traffic "slowdowns" on the various roads in a transportation network. Much of the work on providing information to commuters focuses specifically on travel-time information. However, the model in the present paper allows a system planner to provide slowdown information as well; that is, commuters are additionally told how much slower each route is as compared to its uncongested state. We show that providing this additional information can improve equilibrium routing efficiency when compared to the case when commuters are only given information about travel time, but that these improvements in congestion are not universal. That is, transportation networks exist on which any provision of slowdown information can harm equilibrium congestion. In addition, this paper illuminates a deep connection between the effects of commuter slowdown-sensitivity and the study of marginal-cost pricing and altruism in congestion games.
