论文标题
评估与分配差异的匹配市场中监管效率
Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities
论文作者
论文摘要
基于CAP的法规被广泛用于解决匹配市场中的分布差异，但是它们相对于替代工具（例如补贴）的效率仍然很少了解。本文通过将区域约束纳入可转移的公用事业匹配模型来开发用于评估政策干预措施的框架。我们表明，具有汇总匹配数据的决策者可以实施税收政策，以最大化社会福利，并胜过任何基于上限的政策。使用日本居住匹配计划的新收集的数据，我们估计参与者的偏好，并在基于CAP和基于补贴的策略下模拟反事实匹配结果。结果表明，基于现状的法规会产生巨大的效率损失，而小的目标补贴可以实现具有明显更高社会福利的相似分配目标。
Cap-based regulations are widely used to address distributional disparities in matching markets, but their efficiency relative to alternative instruments such as subsidies remains poorly understood. This paper develops a framework for evaluating policy interventions by incorporating regional constraints into a transferable utility matching model. We show that a policymaker with aggregate-level match data can implement a taxation policy that maximizes social welfare and outperforms any cap-based policy. Using newly collected data from the Japan Residency Matching Program, we estimate participant preferences and simulate counterfactual match outcomes under both cap-based and subsidy-based policies. The results reveal that the status quo cap-based regulation generates substantial efficiency losses, whereas small, targeted subsidies can achieve similar distributional goals with significantly higher social welfare.
