论文标题
没有转移的机制以完全有偏见的药物
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
论文作者
论文摘要
本金必须在两个选项之间做出决定。她喜欢哪一个取决于两个代理商的私人信息。一个代理总是更喜欢第一个选项。另一个总是更喜欢第二个。转移是不可行的。该设置的一种应用是两个竞争部门之间固定预算的有效划分。我们首先表征了在任意相关下的所有可实施机制。其次，我们研究了存在一种机制，该机制在不咨询代理商的情况下选择前最佳决定而产生的收益比她获得的收益高。在预算示例中，这种有利可图的机制存在，并且仅当一个部门的信息也与另一部门的预期回报有关。我们将这种见解推广到为N-代理分配问题中独立类型的存在中存在的必要条件而得出必要和充分的条件。
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application of this setting is the efficient division of a fixed budget between two competing departments. We first characterize all implementable mechanisms under arbitrary correlation. Second, we study when there exists a mechanism that yields the principal a higher payoff than she could receive by choosing the ex-ante optimal decision without consulting the agents. In the budget example, such a profitable mechanism exists if and only if the information of one department is also relevant for the expected returns of the other department. We generalize this insight to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a profitable mechanism in the n-agent allocation problem with independent types.
