论文标题
意识分散的参与者和系统可靠性
Decentralisation Conscious Players And System Reliability
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一个基于Varian的系统可靠性模型的分散系统可靠性的游戏理论模型，我们为其添加了一个新的归一化总努力案例，该案例模型\ textit {Incentralitizatizan Incelization Comitization Comitization Plise}，优先考虑权力分散式化。我们在标准化的总努力游戏中得出了NASH均衡。在这些均衡中，一个或两个值是由无法自由骑行的玩家演奏的。玩家可以调整贡献的速度可以确定如何达到平衡和平衡值。意识到意识的球员的行为对于其他玩家的偏差是强大的。我们的结果突出了意识中心化的参与者在维持权力下放化方面发挥的作用。但是，他们还强调，通过支持一个平衡，这需要重要的贡献，因为贡献均衡价值的贡献仍然可能意味着许多球员的损失，因此不能期望他们增加分权化。我们还讨论了在模型背景下对权力中心化的实用限制。
We propose a game-theoretic model of the reliability of decentralised systems based on Varian's model of system reliability, to which we add a new normalised total effort case that models \textit{decentralisation conscious players} who prioritise decentralisation. We derive the Nash equilibria in the normalised total effort game. In these equilibria, either one or two values are played by players that do not free ride. The speed at which players can adjust their contributions can determine how an equilibrium is reached and equilibrium values. The behaviour of decentralisation conscious players is robust to deviations by other players. Our results highlight the role that decentralisation conscious players can play in maintaining decentralisation. They also highlight, however, that by supporting an equilibrium that requires an important contribution they cannot be expected to increase decentralisation as contributing the equilibrium value may still imply a loss for many players. We also discuss practical constraints on decentralisation in the context of our model.
