论文标题
零售中央银行数字货币（CBDC），分离和财务隐私：巴哈马沙美元的案例
Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC), Disintermediation and Financial Privacy: The Case of the Bahamian Sand Dollar
论文作者
论文摘要
由于其货币政策可能会完全破坏，因此对加密货币的快速增长，以市场驱动的需求担心中央银行。中央银行数字货币（CBDC）可以提供解决方案，但是我们对它们的设计和后果的理解仍处于起步阶段。这份非技术论文探讨了巴哈马如何设计沙美元，这是零售CBDC的第一个现实世界实例。它将沙美元与基于定义的规格进行对比。然后，我制定了场景分析以说明商业银行风险。在此过程中，中央银行成为一名存款垄断者，导致高资金风险，分解风险以及商业银行业的偿付能力风险。我认为，如果要防止银行业中的分解，限制和上限将是CBDC的监管框架的新规格。我将CBDC的匿名性视为会影响其采用的比较劣势。这些发现提供了对中央银行面临的治理问题的见解，并连贯地导致了沙美元的设计。我的结论是，建议打击加密货币是CBDC无法解决的任务。
The fast-growing, market-driven demand for cryptocurrencies worries central banks, as their monetary policy could be completely undermined. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) could offer a solution, yet our understanding of their design and consequences is in its infancy. This non-technical paper examines how The Bahamas has designed the Sand Dollar, the first real-world instance of a retail CBDC. It contrasts the Sand Dollar with definition-based specifications. I then develop a scenario analysis to illustrate commercial bank risks. In this process, the central bank becomes a deposit monopolist, leading to high funding risks, disintermediation risks, and solvency risks for the com-mercial banking sector. I argue that restrictions and caps will be the new specifications of a regulatory framework for CBDCs if disintermediation in the banking sector is to be prevented. I identify the anonymity of CBDCs as a comparative disadvantage that will affect their adoption. These findings provide insight into governance problems facing central banks, and coherently lead to the design of the Sand Dollar. I conclude by suggesting that combating cryptocurrencies is a task that cannot be solved by a CBDC.
