论文标题
永无止境：在NVME存储应用程序中利用RDMA错误
NeVerMore: Exploiting RDMA Mistakes in NVMe-oF Storage Applications
论文作者
论文摘要
本文介绍了Infiniband架构，普遍的RDMA标准和NVME-Over-Fabrics（NVME-OFC）的安全分析，这是一种用于工业分解存储的突出协议，利用RDMA协议以实现低延长率和高型号的良好固态设备。我们的工作Nevermore发现了RDMA协议中的新漏洞，这些漏洞揭示了对启用RDMA的应用程序和NVME的协议的几个攻击向量，这表明协议NVME的当前安全机制并不能解决RDMA使用所带来的安全性漏洞。特别是，我们展示了非特权用户如何将数据包注入到本地网络控制器上创建的任何RDMA连接中，绕过操作系统及其内核的安全机制，以及如何使用注射来获取未经授权的块对NVME设备的访问。总体而言，我们对RDMA协议进行了四次攻击，并对NVME的协议实施了七次攻击，并对NVME的两个最流行的实现：SPDK和Linux内核进行了验证。为了减轻发现的攻击，我们提出了多种机制，可以由RDMA和NVME提供者实施。
This paper presents a security analysis of the InfiniBand architecture, a prevalent RDMA standard, and NVMe-over-Fabrics (NVMe-oF), a prominent protocol for industrial disaggregated storage that exploits RDMA protocols to achieve low-latency and high-bandwidth access to remote solid-state devices. Our work, NeVerMore, discovers new vulnerabilities in RDMA protocols that unveils several attack vectors on RDMA-enabled applications and the NVMe-oF protocol, showing that the current security mechanisms of the NVMe-oF protocol do not address the security vulnerabilities posed by the use of RDMA. In particular, we show how an unprivileged user can inject packets into any RDMA connection created on a local network controller, bypassing security mechanisms of the operating system and its kernel, and how the injection can be used to acquire unauthorized block access to NVMe-oF devices. Overall, we implement four attacks on RDMA protocols and seven attacks on the NVMe-oF protocol and verify them on the two most popular implementations of NVMe-oF: SPDK and the Linux kernel. To mitigate the discovered attacks we propose multiple mechanisms that can be implemented by RDMA and NVMe-oF providers.
