论文标题
侧通道攻击下的强匡威定理用于源加密
Strong Converse Theorem for Source Encryption under Side-Channel Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
我们有兴趣使用侧通道攻击下的对称密钥调查源加密的安全性。在本文中，我们提出了一个源加密的一般框架，该源加密的一般框架在侧通道攻击下使用对称键，该键适用于\ emph {any}源加密，并具有对称键和\ emph {any}的侧向通道攻击针对秘密钥匙的侧向通道攻击。我们还提出了一个新的安全标准，以在侧通道攻击下进行强有力的保密性，这是相互信息的自然扩展，即\ emph {\ emph {鉴于对抗性钥匙泄漏的明文和密文之间的最大条件相互信息，在所有可能的PlaintExtext分布中最大程度地}。在此新标准下，我们成功地制定了速率区域，即使在侧通道攻击下，它也是必要和足够的条件，即使在侧通道攻击下也可以安全传播。此外，我们还证明了我们的新安全标准的另一个理论结果，这本身可能是有趣的：对于不可记忆的无内存来源，在标准安全标准中没有完美的保密性，即普通互助，即普通信息，在不实现这一新的安全企业的情况下，可以实现完美的秘密，而这是新的安全企业，这是更加严格的。
We are interested in investigating the security of source encryption with a symmetric key under side-channel attacks. In this paper, we propose a general framework of source encryption with a symmetric key under the side-channel attacks, which applies to \emph{any} source encryption with a symmetric key and \emph{any} kind of side-channel attacks targeting the secret key. We also propose a new security criterion for strong secrecy under side-channel attacks, which is a natural extension of mutual information, i.e., \emph{the maximum conditional mutual information between the plaintext and the ciphertext given the adversarial key leakage, where the maximum is taken over all possible plaintext distribution}. Under this new criterion, we successfully formulate the rate region, which serves as both necessary and sufficient conditions to have secure transmission even under side-channel attacks. Furthermore, we also prove another theoretical result on our new security criterion, which might be interesting in its own right: in the case of the discrete memoryless source, no perfect secrecy under side-channel attacks in the standard security criterion, i.e., the ordinary mutual information, is achievable without achieving perfect secrecy in this new security criterion, although our new security criterion is more strict than the standard security criterion.
