论文标题
摩擦经济中的声誉，学习和项目选择
Reputation, Learning and Project Choice in Frictional Economies
论文作者
论文摘要
我介绍了具有未知能力的长寿代理商和具有可观察质量的异质项目之间的学习和随机会议的动态模型。代理商与项目的匹配结果决定了她对自己能力的后验信仰（即她的声誉）。在具有内源性外部选择的自我型学习框架中，我发现了代理的最佳项目选择策略，该策略确定了具有一定声誉水平的代理商的哪些类型的项目。最佳匹配集的部分变为增加的间隔，不同类型的项目的截止程度不同。提高会议率对匹配集的各个部分具有不对称的影响：它明确扩展了高型项目的部分，而在某些地区，它最初会扩展，然后缩小低型项目的部分。
I introduce a dynamic model of learning and random meetings between a long-lived agent with unknown ability and heterogeneous projects with observable qualities. The outcomes of the agent's matches with the projects determine her posterior belief about her ability (i.e., her reputation). In a self-type learning framework with endogenous outside option, I find the optimal project selection strategy of the agent, that determines what types of projects the agent with a certain level of reputation will accept. Sections of the optimal matching set become increasing intervals, with different cutoffs across different types of the projects. Increasing the meeting rate has asymmetric effects on the sections of the matching sets: it unambiguously expands the section for the high type projects, while on some regions, it initially expands and then shrinks the section of the low type projects.
