论文标题
组合拍卖中简单竞标的成本
The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在组合拍卖中研究了一类操纵，在这些操作中，投标人从根本上歪曲了他们感兴趣的商品。先前的工作很大程度上假设竞标者只对他们的兴趣捆绑提交了投标，我们称之为简单的竞标：对竞标数量进行策略，而不是捆绑捆绑的身份。但是，我们表明存在整个拍卖实例，这些实例在贝叶斯 - 纳什均衡中永远不会最佳出价，始终严格由复杂的投标（Bidders竞标他们不感兴趣的商品）。我们显示了两个最广泛使用的拍卖机制的结果：首价和VCG-Nearest。我们还探讨了赢家确定问题的结构特性，这些问题引起了这种现象，我们使用所获得的见解来研究复杂的竞标。我们发现，在最坏的情况下，即使投标人仅对单个商品感兴趣，竞标者的最佳复杂竞标也可能需要竞标指数捆绑。因此，这种现象会极大地影响拍卖的结果，竞标者和拍卖设计师都不应忽略。
We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders only submit bids on their bundles of interest, which we call simple bidding: strategizing over the bid amounts, but not the bundle identities. However, we show that there exists an entire class of auction instances for which simple bids are never optimal in Bayes-Nash equilibrium, always being strictly dominated by complex bids (where bidders bid on goods they are not interested in). We show this result for the two most widely used auction mechanisms: first price and VCG-nearest. We also explore the structural properties of the winner determination problem that cause this phenomenon, and we use the insights gained to investigate how impactful complex bidding may be. We find that, in the worst case, a bidder's optimal complex bid may require bidding on an exponential number of bundles, even if the bidder is interested only in a single good. Thus, this phenomenon can greatly impact the auction's outcome and should not be ignored by bidders and auction designers alike.
