论文标题
出售两个补充商品
Selling two complementary goods
论文作者
论文摘要
卖方正在向代理商出售一对可分割的补充商品。代理商仅以特定的比率消费商品，并在任何两种商品中自由处理过量。捆绑包的价值和比率是代理的私人信息。在这个二维类型的空间模型中，我们表征了激励限制，并表明最佳（预期的收入最大化）机制是与比率依赖性的发布价格或一类发行分类的发布价格机制。我们还表明，当价值和比率独立分布时，最佳机制是发布的价格机制。
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either goods. The value of the bundle and the ratio are private information of the agent. In this two-dimensional type space model, we characterize the incentive constraints and show that the optimal (expected revenue-maximizing) mechanism is a ratio-dependent posted price or a posted price mechanism for a class of distributions. We also show that the optimal mechanism is a posted price mechanism when the value and the ratio are independently distributed.
