论文标题
点对点战略沟通
Point-to-Point Strategic Communication
论文作者
论文摘要
我们为联合源通道编码问题提出了一种战略公式，其中编码器和解码器具有不同的失真函数。我们在四种不同的情况下提供解决方案。首先，我们假设编码器和解码器配合以实现一对失真值。其次，我们假设编码器承诺策略，而解码器则实现了最佳响应，就像在说服力游戏中，编码器是Stackelberg的领导者一样。第三，我们认为解码器承诺制定一种策略，例如不匹配的利率延伸问题或机理设计框架中的策略。第四，我们研究了廉价的谈话游戏，在该游戏中，编码和解码策略形成了NASH平衡。
We propose a strategic formulation for the joint source-channel coding problem in which the encoder and the decoder are endowed with distinct distortion functions. We provide the solutions in four different scenarios. First, we assume that the encoder and the decoder cooperate in order to achieve a certain pair of distortion values. Second, we suppose that the encoder commits to a strategy whereas the decoder implements a best response, as in the persuasion game where the encoder is the Stackelberg leader. Third, we consider that the decoder commits to a strategy, as in the mismatched rate-distortion problem or as in the mechanism design framework. Fourth, we investigate the cheap talk game in which the encoding and the decoding strategies form a Nash equilibrium.
