论文标题
大型网络的扩散
Diffusion in large networks
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一个与网络中与邻居相互作用的个人社会中扩散的现象。在给定的时间,每个人都具有活动性或无效。扩散是由两个特征驱动的:网络结构和由聚集函数表示的扩散机制。我们区分了两种扩散机制(概率,确定性),并专注于两种类型的聚集函数(严格,布尔值)。在严格的汇总功能下,社会的两极分化是不可能发生的,其状态朝着无限许多活跃和无限的许多不活跃的代理人或同质社会的混合而发展。在布尔集合函数下,扩散过程成为确定性,莫里斯(2000)的传染模型成为我们框架的特殊情况。然后可以发生极化。我们的动态也允许在两种情况下进行周期。网络结构与这些问题无关,但对于以丰富性假设为代价建立不可约性很重要:该网络应包含无限的许多复杂恒星,并且有足够的空间来存储本地配置。我们的模型可以通过本地协调游戏给予游戏理论解释,每个玩家将在随机社区中采用最佳响应策略。
We investigate the phenomenon of diffusion in a countably infinite society of individuals interacting with their neighbors in a network. At a given time, each individual is either active or inactive. The diffusion is driven by two characteristics: the network structure and the diffusion mechanism represented by an aggregation function. We distinguish between two diffusion mechanisms (probabilistic, deterministic) and focus on two types of aggregation functions (strict, Boolean). Under strict aggregation functions, polarization of the society cannot happen, and its state evolves towards a mixture of infinitely many active and infinitely many inactive agents, or towards a homogeneous society. Under Boolean aggregation functions, the diffusion process becomes deterministic and the contagion model of Morris (2000) becomes a particular case of our framework. Polarization can then happen. Our dynamics also allows for cycles in both cases. The network structure is not relevant for these questions, but is important for establishing irreducibility, at the price of a richness assumption: the network should contain infinitely many complex stars and have enough space for storing local configurations. Our model can be given a game-theoretic interpretation via a local coordination game, where each player would apply a best-response strategy in a random neighborhood.