论文标题
阻止比特币中的池块预扣攻击
Discouraging Pool Block Withholding Attacks in Bitcoins
论文作者
论文摘要
比特币的出现使对区块链研究和区块采矿的热情，而广泛的采矿池有助于其参与者（即矿工）获得更频繁的奖励。最近，采矿池被证明在几次可能的攻击中很容易受到攻击，而池块预扣攻击就是其中之一：一位战略泳池经理将她的一些矿工派往其他泳池，这些矿工假装在难题上工作，但实际上什么也不做。而且这些矿工仍然获得奖励，因为泳池经理无法认识到这些恶意的矿工。在这项工作中，我们重新审视了池块预扣攻击的游戏理论模型，并提出了修订的方法，以重新分配给矿工的奖励。幸运的是，在新模型中，泳池管理者强烈激励不发动此类攻击。我们表明，对于任何数量的采矿池，无池攻击始终是纳什均衡。此外，只有两个少数矿山池参加，无池攻击实际上是唯一的纳什平衡。
The arisen of Bitcoin has led to much enthusiasm for blockchain research and block mining, and the extensive existence of mining pools helps its participants (i.e., miners) gain reward more frequently. Recently, the mining pools are proved to be vulnerable for several possible attacks, and pool block withholding attack is one of them: one strategic pool manager sends some of her miners to other pools and these miners pretend to work on the puzzles but actually do nothing. And these miners still get reward since the pool manager can not recognize these malicious miners. In this work, we revisit the game-theoretic model for pool block withholding attacks and propose a revised approach to reallocate the reward to the miners. Fortunately, in the new model, the pool managers have strong incentive to not launch such attacks. We show that for any number of mining pools, no-pool-attacks is always a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, with only two minority mining pools participating, no-pool-attacks is actually the unique Nash equilibrium.
