论文标题

30750位二进制场离散对数的计算

Computation of a 30750-Bit Binary Field Discrete Logarithm

论文作者

Granger, Robert, Kleinjung, Thorsten, Lenstra, Arjen K., Wesolowski, Benjamin, Zumbrägel, Jens

论文摘要

本文报告了有限字段中离散对数的计算,$ \ mathbb f_ {2^{30750}} $,以$ \ MATHBB F_ {2^{9234}} $的计算为2014年1月设定的先前记录,该记录在2014年1月设定。目前的计算是由于Granger,Kleinjung和Zumbrägel引起的准多项式算法的消除步骤的必不可少的使用,并且是第一个真正测试并成功地证明其潜力并在恢复时的潜力的大规模实验,这是在导致陈述的复杂性时。它需要在Intel Xeon Ivy Ivy桥处理器的单个核心上等同于2.6 GHz的单个核心年份,这与在质数领域的离散对数记录所花费的大约3100个核心年份相当,该元素在比特长度795的领域中设置在一个位置795的领域,并证明了这一计算级别的问题更容易。为了使计算可行,我们引入了几种创新技术,以消除小度不可还原元素,这意味着我们避免执行任何昂贵的gröbner基础计算,而与2013年初的所有以前的记录相反。最后,该计算应成为密码学家的严重威慑力,他们仍建议在应用中依靠此类有限领域的离散对数安全性,尽管存在两个准多种算法,并且可以开发出更快的算法。

This paper reports on the computation of a discrete logarithm in the finite field $\mathbb F_{2^{30750}}$, breaking by a large margin the previous record, which was set in January 2014 by a computation in $\mathbb F_{2^{9234}}$. The present computation made essential use of the elimination step of the quasi-polynomial algorithm due to Granger, Kleinjung and Zumbrägel, and is the first large-scale experiment to truly test and successfully demonstrate its potential when applied recursively, which is when it leads to the stated complexity. It required the equivalent of about 2900 core years on a single core of an Intel Xeon Ivy Bridge processor running at 2.6 GHz, which is comparable to the approximately 3100 core years expended for the discrete logarithm record for prime fields, set in a field of bit-length 795, and demonstrates just how much easier the problem is for this level of computational effort. In order to make the computation feasible we introduced several innovative techniques for the elimination of small degree irreducible elements, which meant that we avoided performing any costly Gröbner basis computations, in contrast to all previous records since early 2013. While such computations are crucial to the $L(\frac 1 4 + o(1))$ complexity algorithms, they were simply too slow for our purposes. Finally, this computation should serve as a serious deterrent to cryptographers who are still proposing to rely on the discrete logarithm security of such finite fields in applications, despite the existence of two quasi-polynomial algorithms and the prospect of even faster algorithms being developed.

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