论文标题
人造愚蠢
Artificial Stupidity
论文作者
论文摘要
关于AI的公开辩论由Frankenstein综合征主导，担心AI会成为超人并逃脱人类的控制。尽管超级智能肯定是一种可能性，但它激发的兴趣可以分散公众的关注：人为愚蠢的兴起（AS）。本文在玛丽·雪莱（Mary Shelley）的1818年著名小说中讨论了科学怪人综合症的根源。然后，它提供了一个哲学框架来分析人造代理人的愚蠢，这表明现代智能系统可以被视为“判断的愚蠢”。最后，它确定了一种替代文学传统，该传统暴露了AS的危险和好处。在Edmund Spenser的著作中，Jonathan Swift和E.T.A.霍夫曼（Hoffmann），屁股取代，压迫或勾引其人类用户。更乐观的是，约瑟夫·弗菲（Joseph Furphy）和劳伦斯·斯特恩（Laurence Sterne）想象一下可以用作地图或管道的人类智力的屁股。这些作家为当前推动AI辩论的神话提供了强烈的反感。他们确定了即使是愚蠢的人造代理人也可以逃避人类控制的方法，例如，通过诉诸刻板印象或使我们脱离现实。他们强调了越来越自动化的社会中文学想象的持续重要性。
Public debate about AI is dominated by Frankenstein Syndrome, the fear that AI will become superhuman and escape human control. Although superintelligence is certainly a possibility, the interest it excites can distract the public from a more imminent concern: the rise of Artificial Stupidity (AS). This article discusses the roots of Frankenstein Syndrome in Mary Shelley's famous novel of 1818. It then provides a philosophical framework for analysing the stupidity of artificial agents, demonstrating that modern intelligent systems can be seen to suffer from 'stupidity of judgement'. Finally it identifies an alternative literary tradition that exposes the perils and benefits of AS. In the writings of Edmund Spenser, Jonathan Swift and E.T.A. Hoffmann, ASs replace, oppress or seduce their human users. More optimistically, Joseph Furphy and Laurence Sterne imagine ASs that can serve human intellect as maps or as pipes. These writers provide a strong counternarrative to the myths that currently drive the AI debate. They identify ways in which even stupid artificial agents can evade human control, for instance by appealing to stereotypes or distancing us from reality. And they underscore the continuing importance of the literary imagination in an increasingly automated society.
