论文标题
欺骗和偏好的共同进化：达尔文和纳什会面
Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
论文作者
论文摘要
我们开发了一个框架，在该框架中，个人的偏好与他们欺骗他人的偏好和意图的能力相结合。具体而言，个体的特征是（i）认知成熟水平和（ii）主观效用函数。认知的增加是昂贵的，但是高级人士的优势是能够欺骗低级对手对他们在某些比赛中的偏好和意图的优势。在其余的比赛中，个人观察到彼此的偏好。我们的主要结果表明，从本质上讲，只有有效的结果才能稳定。此外，在额外的轻度假设下，我们表明，当且仅当单方面偏差的收益小于环境中欺骗的有效成本时，有效的结果是稳定的。
We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals have the advantage of being able to deceive lower-level opponents about their preferences and intentions in some of the matches. In the remaining matches, the individuals observe each other's preferences. Our main result shows that, essentially, only efficient outcomes can be stable. Moreover, under additional mild assumptions, we show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if the gain from unilateral deviation is smaller than the effective cost of deception in the environment.
