论文标题
中间人和拒绝无线秘密密钥一代中的服务攻击
Man-in-the-Middle and Denial of Service Attacks in Wireless Secret Key Generation
论文作者
论文摘要
无线秘密密钥生成（W-SKG）来自共享随机性（例如，来自无线通道褪色实现），是一个已建立的方案，可用于会话密钥协议。 W-SKG方法在延迟受约束的无线网络中可能特别感兴趣，尤其是在第五代（B5G）系统中超可靠的低潜伏期通信（URLLC）的背景下。然而，已知W-SKG方案在所谓的“优势蒸馏”阶段具有延展性，在此期间，在合法各方获得了共享随机性的观察。例如，主动攻击者可以通过注射飞行员信号和/或可以以干扰形式将服务攻击（DOS）充当中间人（MIM）。本文研究了W-SKG注射和反应性干扰攻击的影响。首先，证明可以将注射攻击减少到 - 可能较小的危害 - 飞行员随机攻击攻击；提出了具有随机QPSK飞行员的新型系统设计。随后，使用游戏理论公式，在存在反应性干扰器的情况下，在块褪色的加性白色高斯噪声（BF-AWGN）通道中确定了最佳干扰策略。结果表明，反应性干扰器的影响要比简单的主动干扰器要严重得多
Wireless secret key generation (W-SKG) from shared randomness (e.g., from the wireless channel fading realizations), is a well established scheme that can be used for session key agreement. W-SKG approaches can be of particular interest in delay constrained wireless networks and notably in the context of ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) in beyond fifth generation (B5G) systems. However, W-SKG schemes are known to be malleable over the so called "advantage distillation" phase, during which observations of the shared randomness are obtained at the legitimate parties. As an example, an active attacker can act as a man-in-the-middle (MiM) by injecting pilot signals and/or can mount denial of service attacks (DoS) in the form of jamming. This paper investigates the impact of injection and reactive jamming attacks in W-SKG. First, it is demonstrated that injection attacks can be reduced to - potentially less harmful - jamming attacks by pilot randomization; a novel system design with randomized QPSK pilots is presented. Subsequently, the optimal jamming strategy is identified in a block fading additive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channel in the presence of a reactive jammer, using a game theoretic formulation. It is shown that the impact of a reactive jammer is far more severe than that of a simple proactive jammer
