论文标题

人类驾驶和应用程序的游戏理论模型

A Game-Theoretic Model of Human Driving and Application to Discretionary Lane-Changes

论文作者

Yoo, Jehong, Langari, Reza

论文摘要

在本文中,我们考虑了Stackelberg Game理论在轻度拥挤的高速公路环境中建模改变巷道的应用。该模型的基本意图,该模型被参数捕获驾驶员处置(侵略性或不关心),是为了帮助制定自动驾驶汽车的决策策略,以注意人类驾驶员在道路上如何在道路上执行相同功能(在其他地方报告的方式)。这是在单位测试模拟以及批量模式(即使用Monte Carlo方法论)中实现的,通过与NHTSA 100卡的自然主义驾驶安全数据相比,通过有限的交通微模拟。特别是,定性比较表明,在定性上造成的崩溃比例相似,造成的崩溃比例与驱动因素不集中(或侵略性)的函数有关,该模型与人类决策的相对一致性。尽管该结果本身并未对所提出的模型提供真正的定量验证,但它确实证明了拟议方法在建模既定的车道改变时的实用性,因此可以在自主驾驶中以与道路上的人类决策一致的方式使用。

In this paper we consider the application of Stackelberg game theory to model discretionary lane-changing in lightly congested highway setting. The fundamental intent of this model, which is parameterized to capture driver disposition (aggressiveness or inattentiveness), is to help with the development of decision-making strategies for autonomous vehicles in ways that are mindful of how human drivers perform the same function on the road (on which have reported elsewhere.) This paper, however, focuses only on the model development and the respective qualitative assessment. This is accomplished in unit test simulations as well as in bulk mode (i.e. using the Monte Carlo methodology), via a limited traffic micro-simulation compared against the NHTSA 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Safety data. In particular, a qualitative comparison shows the relative consistency of the proposed model with human decision-making in terms of producing qualitatively similar proportions of crashes and near crashes as a function of driver inattentiveness (or aggressiveness). While this result by itself does not offer a true quantitative validation of the proposed model, it does demonstrate the utility of the proposed approach in modeling discretionary lane-changing and may therefore be of use in autonomous driving in a manner that is consistent with human decision making on the road.

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