论文标题
社交媒体和民主中的误导信息：一种机制设计方法
Social Media and Misleading Information in a Democracy: A Mechanism Design Approach
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们提出了一种资源分配机制，以激励有限数量的战略社交媒体平台之间过滤。我们考虑存在战略政府的存在以及有关错误信息如何影响社交媒体平台用户的私人知识。我们提出的机制激励社交媒体平台有效地过滤误导性信息，从而间接阻止了假新闻的传播。特别是，我们设计了一种经济启发的机制，该机制强烈实现了所有通用的NASH平衡，以有效地过滤诱导游戏中的误导信息。我们表明，我们的机制是个人合理的，预算平衡的，而它至少具有一个平衡。最后，我们表明，对于准共期实用程序和约束，我们的机制接收了广义的NASH平衡，并实现了帕累托有效的解决方案。
In this paper, we present a resource allocation mechanism for the problem of incentivizing filtering among a finite number of strategic social media platforms. We consider the presence of a strategic government and private knowledge of how misinformation affects the users of the social media platforms. Our proposed mechanism incentivizes social media platforms to filter misleading information efficiently, and thus indirectly prevents the spread of fake news. In particular, we design an economically inspired mechanism that strongly implements all generalized Nash equilibria for efficient filtering of misleading information in the induced game. We show that our mechanism is individually rational, budget balanced, while it has at least one equilibrium. Finally, we show that for quasi-concave utilities and constraints, our mechanism admits a generalized Nash equilibrium and implements a Pareto efficient solution.
