论文标题
针对Rank-1无法检测到的时间同步攻击的网格的安全措施
Security Measures for Grids against Rank-1 Undetectable Time-Synchronization Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
对相量测量单元（PMU）的时间同步攻击对智能电网构成了真正的威胁；结果表明，它们在实践中是可行的，并且可以对状态估计产生不可忽略的负面影响，而不会触发不良数据检测机制。先前的工作确定了靶向PMU时测量单个相思时的漏洞条件。但是，PMU能够测量数量。在PMU衡量任何数量的相位量并可以共享同一时间参考的一般情况下，我们提出了新的脆弱性条件。一个是一个足够的条件，不取决于测量值。我们提出了一个防止它的安全要求，并提供了实施它的贪婪的离线算法。如果满足了此安全性要求，则仍然有可能攻击网格，尽管我们猜想这不太可能。我们确定两个取决于测量值的充分和必要的漏洞条件。对于每个人，我们提供了一个指标，以显示观察到的和脆弱性条件之间的距离。我们建议他们监视安全性。数值结果，在IEEE-39带有实际负载配置文件的总线基准上，表明满足我们安全要求的网格的测量值远非脆弱。
Time-synchronization attacks on phasor measurement units (PMU) pose a real threat to smart grids; it was shown that they are feasible in practice and that they can have a non-negligible negative impact on the state estimation, without triggering the bad-data detection mechanisms. Previous works identified vulnerability conditions when targeted PMUs measure a single phasor. Yet, PMUs are capable of measuring several quantities. We present novel vulnerability conditions in the general case where PMUs measure any number of phasors and can share the same time reference. One is a sufficient condition that does not depend on the measurement values. We propose a security requirement that prevents it and provide a greedy offline algorithm that enforces it. If this security requirement is satisfied, there is still a possibility that the grid can be attacked, although we conjecture that it is very unlikely. We identify two sufficient and necessary vulnerability conditions which depend on the measurement values. For each, we provide a metric that shows the distance between the observed and vulnerability conditions. We recommend their monitoring for security. Numerical results, on the IEEE-39 bus benchmark with real load profiles, show that the measurements of a grid satisfying our security requirement are far from vulnerable.
