论文标题
拉姆西的最佳政策与多个均衡，以及财政和货币互动
Ramsey Optimal Policy versus Multiple Equilibria with Fiscal and Monetary Interactions
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了基于Leeper（1991）的无摩擦恒定捐赠经济。在这种经济中，可以表明，在临时货币规则和临时财政规则下，有两个均衡。一个具有积极的货币政策和被动的财政政策，而另一个具有被动的货币政策和主动财政政策。我们考虑了一个扩展的设置，其中政策制定者如Schaumburg和Tambalotti（2007年）那样将损失函数最小化。在这种表述下，存在独特的拉姆西均衡，带有利率钉和被动的财政政策。我们感谢约翰·P·康利（John P.
We consider a frictionless constant endowment economy based on Leeper (1991). In this economy, it is shown that, under an ad-hoc monetary rule and an ad-hoc fiscal rule, there are two equilibria. One has active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy, while the other has passive monetary policy and active fiscal policy. We consider an extended setup in which the policy maker minimizes a loss function under quasi-commitment, as in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007). Under this formulation there exists a unique Ramsey equilibrium, with an interest rate peg and a passive fiscal policy. We thank John P. Conley, Luis de Araujo and one referree for their very helpful comments.
